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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the link between the political and institutional context and 
privatization sales prices. The latter serves as a measure for assessing the relative 
performance of the privatization goals. Whereas this link has been studied 
theoretically, there are very few, if any, empirical papers on this relationship. 
Using data from 308 privatizations around the world and applying a cross-country 
approach (including instrumental variables), we find that, while the overall 
political regime does not matter much for prices, the political processes beyond 
the basic regime do matter. Institutional context also produces a significant impact 
on prices. Both results are robust to changes in specification. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite 20 years of massive privatization around the world, empirical studies on the 
determinants of privatization prices are rather limited. This gap in the literature is remarkable, 
since prices provide a means of comparing across firms and constitute an outcome measure for 
assessing the relative performance of the privatization goals pursued by the various governments. 
In fact, the existing literature on privatization prices has focused on one single issue when 
analyzing prices as outcomes—that of restructuring before privatization. Not only does 
restructuring involve reducing the total indebtedness of the state-owned enterprise, but it also 
involves selling off or closing down unproductive divisions of a state-owned enterprise, 
reconfiguring the company’s manufacturing process, changing suppliers and customers and, 
most painful of all, laying off redundant workers. Critics argue that poor restructuring before 
privatization is a key concern.
1  
Firm restructuring, however, does not exist in a vacuum. The political and institutional 
context matters and can have a crucial bearing on privatization outcome variables, such as sales 
prices. As obvious as this may sound, and despite some recent theoretical research on the subject, 
the  only empirical research that studies the link between political processes, governance, and 
privatization prices is extremely limited. This paper tries to fill this void. In fact, the previous 
theoretical research has already identified some likely political links. For example, Biais and 
Perotti (2002) analyze politically motivated privatization design in a bipartisan environment 
where politicians lack commitment power. They found that when the median class a priori takes 
into account redistributive policies, strategic privatization programs that allocate the median 
class enough shares can induce a voting shift away from left-wing parties whose policy would 
reduce the value of shareholdings. The authors suggest that it could be in the interest of right-
wing or “market-friendly” politicians in office to underprice a state-owned enterprise in order to 
modify the preferences of the population in terms of redistribution and therefore increase their 
                                                       
1 For Mexico, López-de-Silanes (1997) shows that the optimal policy seems to be to refrain as much as possible 
from engaging in restructuring. Some of the most popular measures, such as debt absorption, do not increase net 
prices, while measures such as the establishment of investment and efficiency programs actually reduce net prices.  
Also, Chong and López-de-Silanes (2004) find that labor retrenchment has little impact on privatization prices and 
argue that this may be due to adverse selection in the process of laying off workers before privatization. They 
provide further evidence of this by using firm re-hires after privatization as a proxy for the quality of the 
retrenchment program. Chong and Galdo (2005) find that in the case of telecoms, while most measures have no 
bearing on privatization prices, the presence of a regulatory agency prior to privatization does impact prices, 
especially if it was set up well before the sale.   5
probability of being re-elected. Underpricing can be used as a signaling device to show a 
willingness to bear most of the redistribution costs associated with subsequent interference in the 
firm (Perotti, 1995).  
In fact, sometimes governments need to offer concessions to overcome political obstacles 
to privatization. They need to convince investors that they are willing to relinquish control and 
that they value the economic benefits of privatization more than immediate proceeds, since 
powerful interest groups seek favorable terms for themselves in return for dropping their 
opposition to privatizations and  investors are uncertain about the government’s degree of 
commitment to market-friendly policies. After all, politicians seek to provide services in-house 
because they derive political benefit, such as support from public-sector unions and the ability to 
undertake political projects, among other things (López-de-Silanes, 1997). They seek to win the 
support—or at least avoid the active opposition—of these unions, which are the major 
beneficiaries of in-house provisions. This political context comes from a voter preference for 
lower taxes, which leads to lower public budgets and makes in-house provision less affordable. 
Similarly, clean government laws reduce the political benefits of in-house provision, since they 
restrict politicians’ freedom of action and make restructuring before privatization and 
privatization itself more likely (López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Alternatively, 
politicians may have strong incentives to create obscure and arbitrary privatization mechanisms 
that allow them to extract higher rents for themselves or their constituencies.  
Among the scarce evidence on the impact of the politics of the privatization process on 
post-privatization outcomes is Perotti and Oijen (2001), who investigate whether privatization in 
emerging economies has a significant indirect effect on local stock market development through 
the resolution of political risk. They argue that a sustained privatization program represents a 
major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty over political commitment to a market-
oriented policy as well as to regulatory and private property rights. They also present evidence 
suggesting that progress in privatization is correlated with improvements in perceived political 
risk and that these improvements are significantly larger in privatizing countries than in non-
privatizing countries, indicating that the resolution of such risk is endogenous to the privatization 
process. Their analysis further shows that changes in political risk in general tend to have a 
strong effect on local stock market development and excess returns in emerging economies, 
suggesting that political risk is a priced factor. Also, they conclude that the resolution of political   6
risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the rapid growth of 
stock markets in emerging economies.
2   
This paper uses net prices, typically defined as the net privatization price after the costs 
of privatization and restructuring are deducted, divided by the dollar value of the firms’ assets. In 
fact, in most countries, the price paid was a crucial factor in selecting winners for almost all 
privatized state-owned enterprises (López-de-Silanes, 1997). Furthermore, whereas economists 
have generally endorsed the goal of maximizing revenues, Bolton and Roland (1992) show that a 
policy of maximizing net sales revenue is likely to be consistent with a policy of maximizing 
social welfare since the proceeds from the sale can be used to subsidize employment, investment, 
a social safety net and other public goods.
3 
The privatization database employed in this paper is from Chong and López-de-Silanes 
(2004). It was constructed by randomly selecting 400 international firms privatized between 
1982 and 2000. The authors obtained pre- and post-privatization data by sending a detailed 
questionnaire to the CEOs of privatized firms and by accessing privatization files. They 
corroborated the answers with several public sources and data for these firms coming from 
international financial agencies and privatization ministries. The result is a comprehensive cross-
country database with firm characteristics and restructuring policies before privatization. This 
paper complements the Chong and López-de-Silanes database with well-known and widely 
employed data on governance and political processes, such as Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003), Beck et al. (2001) and others. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and discusses the 
empirical methodology. Section 3 examines whether the political and governance contexts have 
an impact on privatization prices and whether such results hold when potential endogeneity is 
taken into account. Section 4 provides robustness results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
                                                       
2 Two more empirical studies that link politics and privatization outcomes are Bel and Trillas (2005) and Bortolotti, 
Fantini and Siniscalco (2003). 
3 It has been claimed that with privatization, governments pursue political and economic objectives other than a 
mere maximization of proceeds.  Issues of transfer control, the pricing of offers and the allocation of shares have 
been mentioned. Still, this paper follows López-de-Silanes (1997) and implicitly assumes that revenue maximization 
is the crucial objective function.   7
2. Data and Basic Methodology 
Two main datasets were used to analyze the political and institutional determinants of 
privatization prices: one assembled by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2004) and another 
constructed by Beck et al. (2001).. The first is a random sample of privatization processes, 
consisting of 308 observations from a list of 1,500 privatization processes throughout the world 
for the period 1982-2000, drawn from the World Bank Privatization database and Privatisation 
International. The authors collected information on pre-privatization firm characteristics like 
sales, assets, profits, liabilities and sector of origin and the main features of the privatization 
process: net prices received by the government, the sale mechanism used to divest the firm, 
percentage of shares sold and the extent to which foreign participation is allowed.
4 These data are 
augmented with country-level data that combine political and institutional variables, particularly 
the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) constructed by Beck et  al. (2001), but also the well-
known Polity V database (Jaggers and Moore, 1995) and a variable on political constraints 
constructed by Henisz (2000). As for the governance variable, data from Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003) is primarily used, but the robustness of the results is checked with data from 
International Country Risk Guide (2005) and BERI (Knack and Keefer, 1995). 
The key dependent variable used in this paper is the privatization sales price from Chong 
and López-de-Silanes (2004). They define this variable as the amount that accrues to the 
government after all privatization and streamlining costs are taken into account, including 
government commitments, special clauses, and other adjustments that are made to the sales 
contract at the time of the sale. After all the relevant costs of privatization are considered, the net 
transaction price is often very different from the price announced in the sales contract. This 
number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and divided by the average net 
sales during the three years prior to privatization. The real value of the resulting number as of 
December 2000 is the dependent variable employed, which is labeled “Net Privatization 
Price/Sales.”
5 While this measure closely follows the corresponding privatization price measure 
used in the seminal paper by López-de-Silanes (1997), data limitations impeded our efforts to 
                                                       
4 From an original sample of 400 cases, the authors ultimately used 308 privatization processes in 84 countries 
because some firms did not supply complete information, merged, did not keep independent records, were liquidated 
and no longer exist, or simply refused to provide any information. Of the 308 cases, 16 were failed privatizations or 
operations in which preparation for privatization occurred but the sale did not materialize (Chong and López-de-
Silanes, 2004).   8
replicate his “Privatization Q” measure, which also includes the firms’ total assets and total 
liabilities in the price formula. However, in the empirical section, regressions include a dummy 
variable to control for net liabilities.
6   
The Database on Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) is a large cross-country database 
that covers 177 countries from 1975 to 2000. It includes information about elections, electoral 
rules, type of political systems, party composition, the extent of military influence on the 
government, checks and balances and political stability. The main advantage of this dataset is 
that almost all of its variables are objectively measured as opposed to other widely used sources, 
which tend to be subjective. In particular, we focus on electoral competitiveness issues because 
the policy choices of politicians are likely to be influenced by the likelihood that those choices 
will lead to their replacement. In fact, this feature has been considered as an important potential 
political determinant of privatization prices (Chong and Galdo, 2005). The database of political 
institutions classifies political competitiveness using a seven-category scale according to the 
number of parties that could and did compete in the last executive and legislative elections. This 
index increases on the level of competitiveness and goes from 1 in cases where there are no 
executive or legislative elections to 7 where multiple parties are legal and compete in the 
elections and the largest party received less than 75 percent of the vote. Since both the legislative 
and executive competitiveness indices are highly correlated in our sample (0.85), they were 
combined to create one single variable called Electoral Competitiveness, which takes a value of 
1 if the country achieves the highest value on either the executive or legislative competitiveness 
index, and 0 otherwise.
7 The other variables from the Database on Political Institutions included 
in this paper are Allhouse, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the Executive’s 
party controls all relevant houses, and 0 otherwise. This variable is intended to capture the 
relative strength of government in the legislature. Fraud indicates whether the outcome of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
5 This variable may also be labeled as the “P/S value,” since it reflects share price divided by sales per share. 
6 In general, the price measure we use is the best possible measure that our data allowed. Two possible alternative 
price measures are (i) share price/earnings per share, and (ii) share price/value of assets per share. These could not 
be constructed for lack of sufficient data, particularly for developing countries. Furthermore, around half the sample 
had negative profits prior to privatization. Following López-de-Silanes (1997), we also compute a price measure that 
assumes that the government’s objective includes investment objectives and shares granted to workers. We use a 
small sub-sample for which data is available (28 observations) and find a statistically significant correlation of 0.97 
with the measure we use in this research. This is slightly higher than the correlation found by López-de-Silanes 
(0.95). 
7 For 90 percent of the observations in the sample, both the indices of legislative and executive competitiveness took 
a value of 6 or higher.   9
last executive and/or legislative elections was disrupted due to the presence of electoral fraud or 
candidate intimidation. Right is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the Chief Executive 
belongs to a right-wing party, and 0 otherwise. Finally, Political Cohesion is a variable originally 
proposed by Roubini and Sachs (1989). It goes from 0 for one-party majority parliamentary 
government or a presidential government with the same party in the majority in the executive 
and legislative branch, to 3 for minority parliamentary governments.  
Additionally, data on political interaction were derived from two different sources. The 
first is from Henisz (2000), who derives a measure of political constraints from a simple spatial 
model of political interaction that incorporates information on the number of independent 
branches of government with veto power and the distribution of preferences across and within 
those branches. The other data source is the relatively well-known Polity V dataset (Jaggers and 
Moore, 1995). In particular, we use the variable Institutionalized Democracy, which is an annual 
index based on three categories that try to account for different characteristics of a democracy: 
(i) executive recruitment (of the Chief Executive), (ii) responsiveness or independence of 
executive authority, and (iii) extent of political competition or opposition. The first measures the 
extent of institutionalization of executive transfers, the competitiveness of executive selection in 
terms of electoral systems and the openness of executive recruitment. The second category 
reflects the extent to which preferences of third parties are taken into account in the decision-
making process of the head of the government. It measures the extent to which the Executive is 
dependent on a cabinet, and the magnitude to which decision rules constrain the actions of the 
Executive. The third category reflects the extent to which the political system enables a non-elite 
to influence a political elite and focuses on both the degree of institutionalization of political 
participation and the extent of government restriction on political competition. Based on these 
categories, an index of democracy was constructed. It goes from 0 to 10, with higher scores 
representing higher degrees of democracy.   
In terms of the institutional country-level explanatory variables, we used the well-known 
governance indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). From a large set of 
sources combining both large opinion surveys and measures based on polls of experts, the 
authors define governance using six clusters of variables: (i) Voice and Accountability, (ii) 
Political Instability and Violence, (iii) Government Effectiveness, (iv) Regulatory Burden, (v) 
Rule of Law and (vi) Corruption. Using an unobserved components model that expresses   10
observed data as a linear function of unobserved governance plus a disturbance term capturing 
perception errors and/or sample variation in each indicator, the authors aggregate the governance 
indicators into each one of the six clusters described above. As an aggregate measure, we use the 
simple average of these indicators for each country. The main disadvantage of this variable is its 
lack of temporal coverage, as it has only been calculated since 1996, and not on a yearly basis. 
Thus, we use the value of the governance indicator closest to the year that privatization took 
place. Given the fact that the intertemporal correlation of the measures is rather high, the fact that 
in some instances we are not able to match the privatization year with the year of the governance 
indicator is of relatively little concern.
8 The scores range from –2.5 to 2.5; the higher the score, 
the better the institutional indicator. 
Following López-de-Silanes (1997) and Chong and López-de-Silanes (2004), we estimate 
the following reduced form equation: 
 
Pi j    =   f  (  Xij,   Mj,  Gj  )               (1) 
 
which formalizes the link between the net privatization price of firm i in country j, Pij with 
respect to a vector of firm privatization characteristics (Xij), a set of macroeconomic controls and 
political regime characteristics (Mj), and a governance measure (Gj). In particular, Xij includes a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the three-year average of net total liabilities is 
greater than zero prior to privatization; four economic sector dummies,
9 a dummy variable for 
the method used to sell the firm that takes the value of 1 for public offerings and 0 for other 
methods such as private direct sales, secondary offers, joint ventures, and purchases by 
employees; the percentage of shares sold; a foreign participation dummy; a dummy that accounts 
for protests, strikes or picketing up to three years prior to the privatization; and the number of 
years that have passed between the year of privatization of firm i and the start of a privatization 
                                                       
8 This occurs in less than 12 percent of our sample. Furthermore, the results remain practically the same when using 
the 1996 or 1998 value of the governance variable instead of the closest year match. As a robustness check, data 
from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) are also used, particularly the value of the index for the year in 
which each firm was privatized. The index is the simple average of five components: (i) perception of corruption in 
the government, (ii) rule of law, (iii) risk of expropriation, (iv) likelihood of repudiation of contracts by the 
government and (v) quality of bureaucracy. A higher value for each of the components and therefore in the 
aggregate rating indicates a higher degree of governance. Our findings do not change and are not presented here for 
the sake of economy. These results are available upon request. 
9 We considered the following economic sectors: (i) mining (metallic minerals and nonmetallic minerals); (ii) 
manufacturing (canned fish and seafood; sugar mills; tobacco products; beverages; textiles, clothing and leather; 
wood; paper and printing; heavy machinery; transportation equipment); (iii) services (hotels and restaurants; land 
and sea transportation; communications; and recreation); and (iv) others (land; unclassified firms).    11
program in its respective country. This latter variable is used as a proxy for reputation and 
specific knowledge that a government acquires during the privatization program.
10 On the other 
hand, the vector Mj includes legal origin dummies (English Common Law, French Civil Law and 
Socialist Law); the average fiscal deficit as percentage of gross domestic product; and the gross 
domestic product growth rate up to three years before privatization. Mj also includes a broad 
battery of variables related with the political regime and the political process of the country, for 
instance, an index of democracy, the political orientation of the Executive, the number of seats 
that the Executive’s party has in the legislature, and several others. Also, Gj represents a measure 
of governance based on a core of five variables that measure broad dimensions of governance. 
Finally, all regressions include sector dummies, regional dummies, a partial privatization 
dummy, and firm size dummies.
11 Table 1 provides definitions of all the variables used in this 
paper. Similarly, Table 2 provides summary statistics. 
3. Findings 
Table 3 shows simple pairwise correlations among the variables of interest and net privatization 
prices. While the degree of correlation of prices and political variables does not appear to be very 
high, the corresponding signs are consistent with the idea that better institutions and political 
processes do yield higher privatization prices. Moreover, the link is statistically significant at 5 
percent or better in most cases.
12   
Along the same lines, Table 4 provides a test of means and a test of medians between 
political and governance variables and privatization prices. In particular, we divide the sample of 
firms into two groups according to whether the variable of interest equals 1 in case it is a dummy 
variable. When the variable of interest is a continuous variable, the sample is divided into two 
groups depending on whether the median of the variable of interest is above or below the sample 
average. We test whether the mean and median of the key variable of interest, net privatization 
price divided by sales, differs across these groups. Not surprisingly, we find statistically 
                                                       
10 As Bel and Trillas (2005) and Perotti and van Oijen (1999) note, sustained privatization programs represent a 
major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty over political commitment to market-oriented policies as well 
as to regulatory and private property rights. 
11 Sectoral dummies are based on two-digit CIIU classification; regional dummies are Latin America, Africa, and 
Industrial Countries, firm-size dummy accounts for large firms, defined as the top two-thirds above the median in 
terms of sales. 
12 The exceptions are the variables Allhouse and Political Constraints, whose correlation with privatization prices is 
statistically significant at 10 percent, only.   12
significant differences on net privatization prices that appear to be linked to the political context. 
In fact, in almost all the cases we find that political and institutional variables matter as more 
electoral competition, more political cohesion, less electoral fraud, better governance and, in 
general, more democratic values are linked with higher net privatization prices.
13 As encouraging 
as these results are, they are at most suggestive of a relevant link between political context and 
privatization prices. Since there are no additional controls included in these tests, they can hardly 
be construed as definitive evidence.  
Table 5 presents the results of the basic heteroscedasticity-corrected ordinary least 
squares regression. We find that governance and political variables do have a bearing on net 
privatization prices. In fact, most of the political context variables considered from Beck, et al, 
(2001) yield the expected sign and are statistically significant at5 percent or better. As shown in 
Column 1, the only exception is the variable Right, which yields weak statistical significance. 
Furthermore, this variable loses statistical significance when including a democracy variable, as 
shown in Column 3 in the same table. Interestingly, while this latter variable is not statistically 
significant, all the other political context variables do remain so. Additionally, when using the 
aggregate governance measure from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003), we find that the 
link between governance and privatization prices appears to be economically relevant and 
statistically significant at 1 percent or higher in all the regressions, too.
14 In short, it appears that 
both political environment and institutional variables are important factors behind the cross-
country differences in net privatization prices. 
For the most part, the corresponding coefficients of the variables that capture firm 
characteristics also yield the expected results, as shown in both Column 1 and Column 3 in the 
same table. For instance, in the case of net total liabilities, the coefficient is negative although it 
is not statistically significant. This may reflect the fact that new owners do not consider past 
financial performance an accurate measure of the future profitability of the firm, as it does not 
fully reflect expected future profits (Arin and Otken, 2003). On the other hand, we find that 
increasing the percentage of shares sold reduces privatization net prices. A 10 percent increase in 
                                                       
13 The variable political constraint is the only one that did not yield statistical significance for changes in means or 
medians in privatization prices. 
14 We obtain very similar results when using the component variables of this governance index, as well as with 
similar measures of governance and institutions, such as ICRG and BERI (Knack and Keefer, 1995). This is 
expected since the simple correlation among measures and within sub-components is very high.  For the sake of 
economy we do not report these findings but we would be happy to provide them upon request.   13
the percentage shares sold translates into a 2.5 percent reduction of the price evaluated at the 
mean. Similarly, consistent with previous work by López-de-Silanes (1997) and Dewenter and 
Malatesta (1997), we find that increasing competition in the sale of the firm, both by allowing 
foreign participation and through the use of public offers instead of private sales, reduces the 
scope for collusion and therefore generates a positive and statistically significant impact on net 
privatization prices. Furthermore, allowing foreigners to participate in the privatization and using 
public offers as the method to sell the firm increase net privatization by 15 and 13 percent, 
respectively. 
Regarding the set of country level variables, when using ordinary least squares, we find a 
negative and significant effect of past fiscal deficits as percentage of gross domestic product on 
net privatization prices. As Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2003) point out, financially 
distressed governments face considerable pressures to speed up privatization in order to balance 
their finances, providing incentives for underpricing. Our results suggest that indeed, 
governments facing financial difficulties are forced to forego substantial privatization revenues 
relative to more solvent countries, everything else being equal. Additionally, we do not find a 
robust result concerning the law origin variables since their corresponding coefficients present 
very high standard errors. Surprisingly, we find that in our sample, French Civil Law legal 
systems are associated with higher privatization prices, a fact that seems counter-intuitive given 
the lower protection they provide to investors relative to English Common Law legal systems 
(La Porta et. al., 1998). Also, there is a very small economic significance and a marginally 
statistically significant effect of GDP growth on privatization prices in the ordinary least squares 
cases. Finally, we find that the presence of unions or strikes before privatization has a 
statistically significant impact on privatization prices, which is not surprising and is consistent 
with previous research on downsizing prior to privatization (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 
2004).
15 
A problem with these empirical results is that they do not take into account potential 
endogeneity issues. Governments try to restructure state-owned enterprises before the sale in 
order to raise the privatization price, but the negative sign may be simply a reflection that the 
                                                       
15 We also test a proxy for reputation, which yields a very small and insignificant effect on prices. The presence of a 
governance variable in the regressions of Table 5 may already be capturing most of the effect that the credibility of 
the government and its privatization program has on net prices. This is consistent with the fact that the correlation 
between political and institutional variables tends to be very high (Knack and Keefer, 1995).   14
firms in the worst shape are need of restructuring. For instance, if the unobservable 
characteristics of a firm are positively correlated with the presence of strong unions, the 
government may be particularly interested in dismantling such unions. Following López-de-
Silanes (1997), we apply a two-step instrumental variables approach. We estimate a non-linear 
reduced-form equation that describes the probability that a particular variable, such as firm 
restructuring, will be implemented.
16 The instruments used are classified in two groups: firm-
level determinants and macroeconomic-level determinants. The firm-level variables included are: 
(i) a dummy variable to reflect whether a leading agent bank organized privatization, (ii) the 
involvement of the Ministry of Finance or Economy before privatization, (iii) the political 
affiliation of unions, (iv) whether the country was undertaking a structural reform during the 
privatization of the firm, and (v) sectoral dummies. The macroeconomic variables considered 
are: (i) the average GDP growth rate in the three years prior to privatization, (ii) the legal origin 
of the country, and (iii) the average degree of openness in the three years prior to privatization.
17 
As required by this procedure, none of these variables is statistically significant when included in 
the price equation. Also the F-statistic for the excluded instruments is statistically significant at 1 
percent in all cases.
18 Columns 2 and 4 in Table 5 present the basic findings when correcting for 
endogeneity using the above method. The results in the privatization and firm characteristics 
categories are essentially identical to the non-instrumented results above. In particular, we find 
that, again, all the political context variables but the measure “right” are statistically significant 
and yield the expected sign. As in the ordinary least squares case, the democracy variable is not 
statistically significant when including this set of political environment measures. Similarly, as 
before, the governance measure employed is also statistically significant.
19 
Table 6 shows the findings when testing other common political measures used in the 
literature. As in the case of the democracy variable from Polity V used in the benchmark 
specifications in Table 5, we find that for the most part, broad political measures do not have an 
impact on privatization prices. Both the measure of political constraints (Henisz, 2000), and a 
                                                       
16 These variables are excluded instruments, since they are not included in the privatization price equation. These 
instruments have very low statistical power when included directly in the price equation, but they are highly 
correlated with the labor restructuring actions of the firm, as shown by applying F-statistics to test for the joint 
hypothesis that they are all equal to zero (López-de-Silanes, 1997). 
17 In general, these variables closely correspond with the micro and macro variables employed in the first-stage 
privatization price regressions in López-de-Silanes (1997). 
18 Because of space considerations, the first stage for the other labor restructuring measures and for the firm labor 
conditions are not presented. We would be happy to provide them upon request.   15
broad measure of political durability (Jaggers and Moore, 1995) yield the expected signs but 
with little statistical significance. The exception is the Democracy variable based on the Gastil 
Index (Freedom House, 2005), which in the instrumental variable case becomes statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. The findings above are not surprising since all the regressions 
include both a governance measure and political measures (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 
2003). Interestingly, these results stand regardless of whether the same set of more detailed 
measures of political environment used in Table 5 is included or not. Essentially, it appears that 
most of the effect on prices is being captured by the measures that reflect the political process 
within the country rather than by the nominal denomination of the political regime or the broad 
political environment and by the institutional measure. In fact, the political environment 
variables Right, Allhouse and Political Cohesion yield the expected sign and are statistically 
significant at 5 percent or higher. Similar to the findings in Table 5, the variable Fraud is the 
only one not statistically significant. Furthermore, the governance measure is always statistically 
significant at 5 percent or higher in all the regressions shown in Table 6, which is similar to the 
benchmark findings in Table 5. This is consistent with the fact that the correlation between 
governance measures and political measures is rather high and may explain the statistical 
insignificance of the broad political variables.
20 
Interestingly, the result indicating that the overall political regime does not matter much 
for prices whereas the political processes beyond the basic regime do matter are consistent with 
previous research that shows that regime duration is a relevant determinant of economic 
performance as only duration of a regime will ensure that particular political processes take hold 
in the sociopolitical structure of a country because it will help build reputation (Clague et al., 
1996; Chong and Zanforlin, 2004). Because the within-country political variables are statistically 
significant and thus consistent with the above, we further test this idea by including a regime 
duration variable in the benchmark specifications. Table 7 shows the findings, specifically that 
regime duration matters. In fact, whereas the broad democracy measure from Polity V is not 
statistically significant when included by itself, it does become significant when including an 
interactive term that captures an association between democracy and duration of regime. Not 
                                                                                                                                                                           
19 The results do not change when employing other institutional data instead. 
20 Given the similarities with the regressions in Table 5, the coefficients and standard errors of these variables have 
not been included in Table 6. We would be happy to provide this information upon request.   16
only are broad democratic regimes linked with higher net privatization prices, but also the longer 
the duration of the democratic regime, the higher the net privatization price.
21 
For the sake of completeness, Table 8 explores additional institutional measures and 
provides some illustrative robustness exercises with respect to the governance measure employed 
in the benchmark regressions in Table 5. This table shows the corresponding estimate in terms of 
net privatization price premium that would accrue to a country ranked in the 25
th percentile if it 
improved its governance rating to the same level as that of the median country.
22  This required 
using the measures from Kaufmann et al. (2003) as well as their sub-components. We ask how 
much the net privatization prices may increase in a country like China or Cote d’Ivoire if they 
enjoyed the level of governance quality of Thailand or the Philippines, everything else being 
equal.
23 While, as expected, the findings are not as high as suggested by the tests of means and 
medians performed above, they are still economically noteworthy. For instance, if a country like 
Bolivia decreased its level of corruption to that of, say, the Slovak Republic, it would experience 
an increase of 7 percent in the net privatization price perceived for the sale of its state-owned 
enterprises when using the corresponding data governance measures from Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003). We find similar responses for the other governance indicators. Similarly, if a 
country such as Panama improved its government effectiveness to the level of Lithuania, the net 
privatization prices would increase by 8.5 percent when selling public enterprises. Furthermore, 
the net privatization price premium would reach around 7 percent if a country like Slovakia tried 
to catch up with a country like Malaysia in terms of improved regulatory burden. Finally, using 
the aggregate governance indicator in the regression, we find a privatization price premium of 12 
percent for Cote d’Ivoire and 8 percent for Chinese firms when reaching the median value.
24 
                                                       
21 As mentioned above, this finding is consistent with previous research by Clague et al. (1997) and Chong and 
Zanforlin (2004). Furthermore, when including the more detailed, within-country political variables (e.g., Political 
Cohesion,  Allhouse), the results stand. That is, both the democracy measure and the interactive term become 
statistically significant. For the sake of economy, we do not report these results, but they are available on request.  
22 In all cases, the change in the variable from moving from the 25
th percentile to the median is always less than one 
standard deviation. 
23 For the sake of parsimony, if more than one firm is being examined in a country, we report the average 
privatization price premium for all the firms in that country in our sample.  
24 We also obtain economically and statistically significant results when using other institutional data. For example, 
in the case of the well-known ICRG institutional measures, if a country like Ghana improved its overall institutional 
quality so as to catch up with the median country, represented by Brazil, it would experience an increase of 12 
percent in the net privatization prices. We obtain similar results when using the BERI (Knack and Keefer, 1995) 
data set. Moving from the 25
th percentile (e.g., Egypt, with a score of 1.77) to the median of BERI (e.g., Italy with a 
score of 2.12) in terms of overall governance quality would be linked with an increase in net prices of 4.5 percent.    17
4. Robustness to Changes in Specification 
We assess the robustness of our results with respect to the addition of regressors to the 
benchmark specification in Table 5 (Column 1). As in Sala-i-Martín (1997), the entire 
distribution of the estimator of the variable of interest is considered by focusing on the fraction 
of the density function lying on each side of zero.
25 Given that zero divides the area under the 
density in two, the larger of the two areas is denoted cdf(0), regardless of whether it is above or 
below zero. Under the assumption that the distribution of the coefficient of interest is non-
normal, the cdf(0) is calculated as follows:
26 first, consider a group of variables classified as the 
dependent variable, the benchmark explanatory variables, and a set of ancillary variables (XA,i), 
representing a group of related auxiliary variables identified as potentially related to the 
determinants of inequality and institutions. We augment the empirical specifications used in the 
benchmark specifications of Column 1 in Table 5 by using this pool of ancillary variables XA.. 
The idea is to choose up to two variables of this pool at a time, and perform regressions 
including all the possible combinations based on such pool of ancillary variables.
27 We test the 
benchmark specification for all possible combinations of ancillary variables and compute the 
coefficient estimates, their variance, the integrated likelihoods and the individual cdf(0) for each 
regression. This is summarized in the vector  
V=F  )} ˆ , ˆ / 0 ( , , ˆ , ˆ {
2
, , , ,
2
, , j I j I j I j I j I j I L σ γ σ γ Φ . 
We compute the aggregate cdf(0) of our coefficient of interest γI as the weighted average 
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where the weights are the integrated likelihoods,  
 
                                                       
25 If 95 percent of the density function for the estimates of the coefficient of interest lies to the right of zero, one 
could say that this variable is more likely to be correlated with our dependent variable. 
26 Assuming normality yields essentially identical results. 
27 We use 12 ancillary variables: population growth rate, public-sector employment, participation of female workers 
in the labor force, the share of the agricultural sector in output, secondary schooling ratio, share of urban population, 
share of agriculture, rate of growth, external debt, rate of unemployment, membership in the World Trade 
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The variable of interest is said to be strongly correlated (i.e., is robust) with the dependent 
variables if the weighted cdf(0) is greater than or equal to 0.90. The findings are shown in Table 
9. The results are consistent with the results in Table 5. For instance, we find that the measures 
Right and Democracy do not yield robust links with privatization prices. However, we find that 
Fraud, Allhouse and Political Cohesion do yield robust links with privatization prices. This is 
also true in the case of the governance variable because it is a robust determinant of privatization 
prices.
28 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper studies the link between the political and institutional context and net privatization 
sales prices, where the latter serves as a measure of assessing the relative performance of the 
privatization goals. Whereas this link has been studied theoretically, there are very few, if any, 
empirical papers on this relationship. We show that political context matters because it appears 
to be an economically significant determinant of privatization prices. We use data from 308 
privatizations around the world and apply a cross-country approach, including instrumental 
variables. We find that while the overall political regime does not matter much for prices, the 
political processes beyond the basic regime do matter. Institutional context also has a significant 
impact on prices. Both results are robust to changes in specification. While a straightforward 
political recommendation is quite naïve, a more sensible policy lesson from this paper is that 
regime duration appears to matter since countries with younger democracies will receive lower 
returns to the sale of state assets compared to longer-lasting democratic political regimes because 
institutional building and reputation appear to be important elements conducive to higher 
privatization prices. This is consistent with the observation that firms in emerging markets tend 
to receive lower prices compared to firms in industrial countries, ceteris paribus. 
                                                       
28 Similar results are obtained when testing governance measures from ICRG and BERI. Also, the Democracy 
variable is weakly robust (i.e., 10 percent) when testing the specification in Table 7 that includes an interactive term 
with regime duration.   19
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Table 1. Variable Definition 
Variable
Firm Characteristics
Net Privatization price/sales The net real  value of the nominal price of sale in U.S dollars after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken 
into account adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold, and divided by total sales before privatization.
Sales The net real  value of the three-year average of firm sales before privatization denominated in U.S dollars.
Net total liabilities Dummy variable equal to 1 if net total liabilities are greater than zero up to three years prior to privatization,
and 0 otherwise.
Privatization Characteristics
Foreign participation Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign participation was allowed in the privatization process, and 0 otherwise.
Share sold Percentage of firm's shares sold in privatization.
Public Offer Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is sold through a Public Offer, and 0 otherwise (if the sale method is direct (non
competitive) sale, purchase by the employees, joint venture or secondary offer)
Union Strikes Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm has union or if there were any protest, picketing or strikes in the three years prior
to privatization, and zero otherwise.
Duration Is defined as the number of years between the start of privatization of a given firm and the initial year of privatization 
in the country. The initial year of the privatization privatization program is taken from www.privatizationlink.com, 
OECD, and Perotti and van Oijen (1999)
Leading Agent bank Dummy variable equal to 1 if leading agent bank organized privatization process. Leading agent bank is defined as bank that 
organized most privatizations in the country at the time of our research. Agent banks are in charge of obtaining information
on the state-owned enterprise, suggest restructuring measures, and organize the sale itself.
Ministry of Finance or Economy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ministry of finance or economy was responsible for that company, and 0 otherwise.
Political affiliation of unions Dummy variable equal to 1 if political affiliation of union is the same as the political party linked with the ruling government 
at the time of privatization, and 0 otherwise.
Country-level Variables
Gross Domestic Product Gross Domestic Product  (US$ PPP) in logs. Average of the three years prior privatization (World Bank, 2001a).
Inflation Average rate of inflation in the country three years prior privatization (World Bank, 2001a).
Openness Average sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product three years prior 
to privatization (World Bank, 2001a).
OECD Dummy equal to 1 if the country is an OECD country, 0 otherwise.
GDP Growth Average rate of GDP growth of the country three years prior privatization (World Bank, 2001a).
Fiscal Deficit Average fiscal deficit as a percentage of gross domestic product three years prior to privatization (World Bank, 2001a).
Gini Gini coefficient (Deininger and Squire, 1997)
Law origin Legal origin of the country from which company is geographically based upon. Five possible legal origins considered:
English common law;   French civil code ;  German  commercial  code;  Scandinavian commercial code; and Socialist laws 
(La Porta, Lopez-de- Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998).
ICRG Index Simple average of the following component variables: repudiation of contracts, corruption, rule of law, 
expropriation, and bureaucratic quality. It goes from zero to ten. The higher the number the better the index.
BERI Index Simple average of the following component variables:  enforcement of contracts, degree of nationalization,
and bureaucracy. It goes from zero to ten, the higher the better.
Freedom House Simple average of civil rights index and political rights index (1=high degree of civil liberties; 7=virtually no freedom)
Civil Liberties Index Civil liberties index measures the degree of freedom of expression and belief, the right to associate and organize and
the respect of human rights. Political index measures degree of political freedom and also goes from 1 to 7.
Governance Simple average of Voice, Political Instability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory, Corruption and Rule of Law
from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005).
Right Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the Chief Executive belongs to a Right-Wing party, 0 otherwise
Fraud Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if vote fraud or candidate intimidation were serious enough
 to affect the outcome of the last elections, 0 otherwise
Political Cohesion Index of Political Cohesion based on Roubini and Sachs (1989). Range: 0-3. (0=One party majority parliamentary government
or presidential government with the same party in the majority in the executive and legislative branch; 3=Minority
parliamentary government)
Allhouse Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the party of the executive controls all relevant houses, 0 otherwise
Description  22
Table 2 . Summary Statistics  
  Obs Mean  Median Std  Dev Min  Max 
Firm Characteristics:            
Net Privatization Prices/sales  308  0.587  0.609  3.228  0.000  1.367 
Sales  308  1.415  0.140  3.167  0.001  21.991 
Net total liabilities  308  0.432  0.000  0.496  0.000  1.000 
Privatization Characteristics:            
Foreign participation  308  0.682  1.000  0.467  0.000  1.000 
Shares sold  308  0.509  0.506  0.282  0.010  1.000 
Public offering  308  0.688  1.000  0.463  0.000  1.000 
Union Strikes  308  0.474  0.000  0.500  0.000  1.000 
Duration  272  4.643  5.000  3.317  0.000  19.000 
Country-Specific Variables:            
Gross Domestic Product  308  25.398  25.452  1.851  19.45  28.856 
Inflation  308  109.88  11.485  292.7  0.618  1667.2 
GDP Growth  308  3.028  2.726  3.811  -11.14  21.320 
Fiscal deficit  308  -2.580  -2.279  3.475  -14.00  13.629 
Gini  308  38.85  38.000  10.84  18.10  65.500 
Latin America  308  0.328  0.000  0.470  0.000  1.000 
Asia  308  0.078  0.000  0.268  0.000  1.000 
Africa and Middle East  308  0.208  0.000  0.406  0.000  1.000 
Developed Countries  308  0.250  0.000  0.434  0.000  1.000 
Transition Economies  308  0.136  0.000  0.344  0.000  1.000 
OECD   308  0.253  0.000  0.436  0.000  1.000 
English common law  308  0.253  0.000  0.436  0.000  1.000 
French commercial code  308  0.500  0.500  0.501  0.000  1.000 
Socialist/communist laws  308  0.110  0.000  0.314  0.000  1.000 
Governance  293  0.347  0.150  0.685  -1.357  1.719 
Right  267  0.431  0.000  0.496  0.000  1.000 
Fraud  263  0.129  0.000  0.336  0.000  1.000 
Political Cohesion  260  0.776  1.000  0.849  0.000  3.000 
Allhouse  258  0.554  1.000  0.498  0.000  1.000 
            
For the sake of economy, variables used for robustness tests and as instruments are not included in this  
Table (see Appendix).    23
Table 3. Correlation between Political and Institutional Variables 
 
   Privatization Governance Right Fraud Allhouse Electoral Democracy Political  Gastil
   Prices              Competitiveness    Constraints  
Privatization Prices  1                 
Governance 0.334  1               
Right 0.159  0.215  1             
Fraud -0.354  -0.306  -0.119 1           
Allhouse -0.157  -0.227  -0.088 0.343 1         
Electoral Competitiveness  0.285  0.232  0.296 -0.384 -0.318  1       
Democracy 0.338  0.590  0.305 -0.405 -0.460  0.525  1     
Political Constraints  0.238  0.344  0.293 -0.363 -0.341 0.647  0.582  1   
Gastil -0.376  -0.745  -0.307 0.544 0.386  -0.563  -0.805  -0.581  1 
   24




Interest = 1 
Variable of 
Interest = 0 
t-statistic for change 
in means 
z-statistic for change 
in medians 
          
Right 0.677  0.570  2.955  2.782 
Electoral Fraud  0.366  0.655  -5.595  -5.508 
Allhouse 0.560  0.678  3.195  3.201 
Electoral Competitiveness  0.650  0.443  4.479  4.443 
          
 Continuous Variables  Above Median  Below Median
t-statistic for change in 
means 
z-statistic for change 
in medians 
          
Political Cohesion  0.865 0.576  5.924  5.146 
Democracy 0.617  0.520  2.468  2.543 
Political Constraints  0.586  0.589  -0.079  -0.036 
Gastil 0.499  0.703  -5.794  -5.437 
Governance  0.659  0.509   4.184   4.211 
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Table 5. Net Privatization Prices and Political Context 
 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1 percent; ** Significant at 5 percent;  
* Significant at 10 percent.  
 
Variables OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Net  Total  Liabilities  -0.026 -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 
  (0.83) (0.57) (0.60) (0.60) 
Shares  Sold  -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
  (5.82)*** (6.20)*** (5.87)*** (5.95)*** 
Foreign  Participation  0.098 0.025 0.099 0.000 
 (2.58)**  (0.15)  (2.64)***  (0.00) 
Public  Offering  0.103 0.490 0.104 0.492 
  (2.86)*** (3.29)*** (2.88)*** (3.05)*** 
Fiscal  Deficit  -0.011 -0.007 -0.011 -0.007 
  (2.26)**  (1.52) (1.86)* (1.26) 
GDP  Growth  0.008 0.015 0.008 0.015 
 (1.78)*  (3.25)***  (1.63)  (3.18)*** 
English Common Law  -0.026  0.026  -0.032  0.027 
  (0.47) (0.39) (0.58) (0.41) 
French  Civil  Law  0.129 0.170 0.124 0.173 
 (2.12)**  (2.56)**  (2.02)**  (2.68)*** 
Socialist  Law  -0.031 0.044 -0.053 0.043 
  (0.55) (0.57) (0.85) (0.56) 
Union  Strikes  -0.130 -0.104 -0.135 -0.100 
 (2.48)**  (2.03)**  (2.40)**  (1.90)* 
Governance  0.080 0.124 0.058 0.117 
  (2.73)***  (4.34)*** (1.72)* (3.53)*** 
Right  0.059 0.053 0.053 0.054 
 (1.73)*  (1.55)  (1.54)  (1.49) 
Fraud  -0.179 -0.174 -0.179 -0.181 
  (3.20)*** (3.71)*** (3.12)*** (3.63)*** 
Allhouse  0.081 0.097 0.106 0.102 
 (2.09)**  (2.52)**  (2.78)***  (2.64)*** 
Political  Cohesion  0.073 0.066 0.068 0.066 
  (3.05)*** (2.35)** (2.94)*** (2.37)** 
Democracy     0.009  0.000 
     (1.62)  (0.02) 
Constant  0.515 0.258 0.460 0.279 
  (5.10)*** (1.35) (4.69)*** (1.40) 
      





p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sector dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  239 239 234 234 
R-squared  0.53 0.48 0.54 0.48 
F-statistic  14.41 22.88 13.79 23.97 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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Table 6. Political Context and Net Privatization Prices 
 
   OLS    IV     OLS     IV    
             
Political Constraints  -0.006 -0.113 -0.005 -0.114   
  (0.06) (1.13) (0.05) (1.23)   
Gastil Index  -0.023 -0.035 -0.024 -0.038   
  (1.35) (1.87)**  (1.34) (1.66)  
Political Durability  0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003   
   (0.01)   (0.02)   (1.26)  (0.04)    
Controls:                
Political Environment  No    No    Yes    Yes   
Governance  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Sector Dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
              
 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1 percent; ** Significant at 5 percent;  
* Significant at 10 percent.   27
Table 7. Regime Duration and Net Privatization Prices 
Variables OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
Net total liabilities  -0.041  -0.017  -0.045  -0.023 
  (1.37) (0.60) (1.45)  (0.80) 
Shares sold  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004 
  (4.83)*** (5.79)*** (4.98)***  (5.80)*** 
Foreign participation  0.106  0.496  0.106  0.551 
  (2.66)*** (3.38)*** (2.81)***  (4.02)*** 
Public offering  0.098  0.227  0.094  0.269 
  (2.81)*** (1.24) (2.73)***  (1.57) 
Fiscal deficit  -0.011  -0.008  -0.012  -0.009 
  (2.08)** (1.59)  (2.23)***  (1.86)* 
GDP growth  0.001  0.005  -0.000  0.004 
  (0.15) (1.10) (0.04)  (0.90) 
English common law  -0.089  -0.019 -0.093  -0.023 
  (1.22) (0.23) (1.27)  (0.27) 
French civil law  0.074  0.085  0.068  0.102 
  (1.07) (1.58) (0.97)  (1.62) 
Socialist law  0.039  0.067  0.044  0.082 
  (0.51) (0.82) (0.58)  (1.01) 
Union strikes  -0.174  -0.162  -0.166  -0.155 
  (3.58)*** (3.64)*** (3.36)***  (3.36)*** 
Governance 0.097  0.140  0.097  0.138 
  (3.35)*** (4.18)*** (3.40)***  (4.23)*** 
Democracy 0.009  0.003  0.023  0.018 
  (1.11) (0.49)  (2.27)**  (2.31)** 
Democracy*Duration     0.001 0.002 
     (2.88)*** (3.08)*** 
Constant 0.746  0.332  0.742  0.257 
  (7.62)*** (1.63) (7.66)***  (1.34) 
Sector dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 263  262  262  262 
R-squared 0.45  0.40  0.47  0.41 
F-statistic 14.06  19.91  15.89  21.42 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Columns 1 and 3 consider governance, public offering and foreign participation to be exogenous variables 
and provides Ordinary Least Squares estimates. Columns 2 and 4 show the second stage of the two-stage 
least squares procedure in order to account for the possible endogeneity of these variables. Instruments used 
are shown in Table 5. Robust standard errors adjusted by clustering at the country level are given in 
parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1 percent; ** Significant at 5 percent; * Significant at 10 percent.   28
Table 8. Governance and Net Privatization Price Premium 
 
Robust standard errors adjusted by clustering at the country level are given in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1 percent;  
** Significant at 5 percent; * Significant at 10 percent. 
Privatization
Governance Indicator Coefficient t-statistic Country Country  Price
25th Percentile Median Premium
Voice 0.085 4.27*** Tanzania Bulgaria 16.33
Political Instability 0.077 3.28*** Israel Trinidad & Tobago 8.55
Government Effectiveness 0.086 4.33*** Panama Lithuania 8.58
Regulatory Burden 0.095 1.91* Slovak Republic Malaysia 7.21
Rule of Law 0.078 3.49*** Zambia India 12.89
Corruption 0.074 3.69*** Bolivia Slovak Republic 7.30  29
 
Table 9. Robustness to Changes in Specification 
 
 
   Ordinary Least Squares  Instrumental Variables 
   Mean  T-Statistic  cdf  Mean  T-Statistic  cdf 
               
Right 0.056  1.52  0.856  0.055  1.49  0.816 
Fraud -0.178  3.42  0.992  -0.175  3.69  0.992 
Allhouse 0.095  2.37  0.954  0.101  2.66  0.945 
Political Cohesion  0.074  3.06  0.996  0.066  2.37  0.973 
Democracy 0.008  1.59  0.848  0.000  0.02  0.256 
Governance 0.075  1.98  0.949  0.118  4.12  0.997 
The cumulative distribution function is denoted “cdf”. A variable whose weighted cdf(0) is larger than 0.95 is 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable (i.e., it is robust) at a 5 percent statistical significance 
level. The cdf is computed assuming non-normality of the parameters estimated. In the normal case, the 
results are similar.  Results are based on the benchmark regression of Column 1 in Table 5.    30
 
 
Appendix. Instruments for Potentially Endogenous Variables 
 




































Electoral Competitiveness Yes Yes
Foreign Direct Investment Yes Yes
Gini Coefficient Yes
Inflation Yes
Leading Agent Bank Yes
F-statistic on excluded 4.74 14.10 4.63
instruments